Operation Anaconda
Background
After the Northern Alliance and Green Berets of Task Force Dagger had captured the Taliban capital of Kabul in November, 2001, the Taliban government collapsed. Most of the remaining Taliban forces and their Al Qaeda allies had fled into the mountain regions around the Shah-i-kot valley and Tora Bora. These were old mountain and cave areas that were safe zones. The Mujahideen had used these areas to successfully defeat the Soviet troops during the 1980s. The Taliban and Al Qaeda believe the US troops would attack and be crushed just like the Soviets before them. Blinded by their success twenty years before they utilized the same tactics and positions to fight the US. They failed to account for new US technology or US intelligence that had learned from the Soviet mistakes.28
Delta Force and Advanced Force Operations
With the collapse of Taliban government, the US forces needed to know where they had gone and what they were doing. But there was no force established to perform this mission. Delta Force stepped up and organized the AFO to get out and gather intelligence. Their mission was to find a mission. The Army lacked the intelligence to launch operations against them but AFO would soon find the enemy and prepare them for destruction. AFO moved out into the Afghan countryside and started gathering information from the Afghans in the area. They questioned anyone from tribal leaders and warlords to goat herders. They worked themselves into the network of the insurgents. Combining their on the ground intelligence with CIA and Army sources they began building a picture of Taliban activity in the mountains. AFO worked in close proximity to CIA and Special Forces and shared all their information. 29 They gained an understanding of the situation and were getting into the minds of their enemy and that was where they would beat the Taliban and Al Qaeda. AFO fulfilled two important roles of fighting 4GW, finding the enemy network and sharing intelligence without borders.
Photo of the Shah-i-kot Valley. Image modified from Air Force Operation Anaconda Case Study (http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/school/awc/electives/6543_operationanaconda.pdf)
All the intelligence indicated that Al Qaeda and the Taliban would be using the Shah-i-kot valley. There were several villages on the valley floor that could be used to house the fighters and cave complexes above provided fighting positions. There were also multiple trails and that allowed movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The best entrance to the valley was the southern tip of the "whaleback" through the "fishhook." This area would be the principle assault path for the coming operation. The terrain of the Shah-i-kot was easy to understand on paper but AFO needed to learn how to fight in the mountains. They looked at old Soviet documents and battle reports to understand how the Mujahideen had fought. The combined information revealed the Taliban were creatures of habit. 30 They would fight the Americans in the same way, with the same weapons and positions, as they had with the Soviets. They would use the mountains and fight from the high ground keeping their supplies lines coming from Pakistan open.
The documents revealed the patterns and terrain but men were needed on the ground. AFO developed advanced reconnaissance teams who would sneak into the mountains and observe the valley. They confirmed the reports from the Soviets and Afghan civilians and found the Taliban operating in large numbers creating their habitual defenses. With the enemy activity confirmed, it came time to destroy them.
Photo of the Shah-i-kot Valley. Image modified from Air Force Operation Anaconda Case Study (http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/school/awc/electives/6543_operationanaconda.pdf)
All the intelligence indicated that Al Qaeda and the Taliban would be using the Shah-i-kot valley. There were several villages on the valley floor that could be used to house the fighters and cave complexes above provided fighting positions. There were also multiple trails and that allowed movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The best entrance to the valley was the southern tip of the "whaleback" through the "fishhook." This area would be the principle assault path for the coming operation. The terrain of the Shah-i-kot was easy to understand on paper but AFO needed to learn how to fight in the mountains. They looked at old Soviet documents and battle reports to understand how the Mujahideen had fought. The combined information revealed the Taliban were creatures of habit. 30 They would fight the Americans in the same way, with the same weapons and positions, as they had with the Soviets. They would use the mountains and fight from the high ground keeping their supplies lines coming from Pakistan open.
The documents revealed the patterns and terrain but men were needed on the ground. AFO developed advanced reconnaissance teams who would sneak into the mountains and observe the valley. They confirmed the reports from the Soviets and Afghan civilians and found the Taliban operating in large numbers creating their habitual defenses. With the enemy activity confirmed, it came time to destroy them.
US Army Special Forces and Zia Lodin
AFO needed a force to clear the valley of the Taliban and it was decided an Afghan unit would be best prepared to fight in the mountains and secure the valley permanently. Special Forces from Operation Detachment Alpha- 594 were already busy training an Afghan force out of the local Pushtuns. They were lead by an Afghan named Zia Lodin. 31 The men worked hard and were rapidly creating a force that could effectively destroy the Taliban in the valley. The Pushtun force would enter the Shah-i-kot by the "fishhook" and clear the valley. American air power would eliminate heavy resistance and the Green Berets would follow the assault. Both ODA-594 and Zia were incorporated into the intelligence community of AFO with no borders to communication.
Photo of the Shah-i-kot Valley. Image modified from Air Force Operation Anaconda Case Study (http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/school/awc/electives/6543_operationanaconda.pdf)
Photo of the Shah-i-kot Valley. Image modified from Air Force Operation Anaconda Case Study (http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/school/awc/electives/6543_operationanaconda.pdf)
AFO, Navy SEALs, and the 101st Airborne
The AFO recon teams were prepared to enter the valley again, this time to coordinate airstrikes against the Taliban. They needed more men though and they called up Mako 31, a Navy SEAL team. Three teams from AFO would infiltrate the mountains and set up observation posts. From their concealed positions, they would call in laser guided bombs in support of the Pushtun assault.
The only gap in the plan was the open mountain trails leading into Pakistan. If these were not sealed, the Taliban could escape and return to fight another day. The US needed to deny them the ability to run when they are weak. The answer came in an air assault by conventional units from the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain divisions.
The air assault increased the complexity of the mission. If the US infantry did not hit the mountains at the exact time the Pushtun assault could fall apart or the Taliban fighters could escape. Due to poor weather,
Concept of Operation Anaconda. Image modified from US Army History the entire operation was postponed by 24
(http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Images/30-31big.jpg) hours. The three AFO teams, India Juliet and Mako 31 entered the Shah-i-kot valley on March 1st, 2002. The first large scale operation of the war had begun.
The only gap in the plan was the open mountain trails leading into Pakistan. If these were not sealed, the Taliban could escape and return to fight another day. The US needed to deny them the ability to run when they are weak. The answer came in an air assault by conventional units from the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain divisions.
The air assault increased the complexity of the mission. If the US infantry did not hit the mountains at the exact time the Pushtun assault could fall apart or the Taliban fighters could escape. Due to poor weather,
Concept of Operation Anaconda. Image modified from US Army History the entire operation was postponed by 24
(http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Images/30-31big.jpg) hours. The three AFO teams, India Juliet and Mako 31 entered the Shah-i-kot valley on March 1st, 2002. The first large scale operation of the war had begun.
The Battle
AFO recon teams began targeting Taliban and Al Qaeda machine-gun and mortar positions for destruction before sun up. At 0600, the air assault had begun and infantry were scrambling to establish their blocking positions. The infantry was under heavy mortar and machine-gun and mortar fire. They called in airstrikes in support. The Pushtuns began their assault but the infantry was dominating the air support. When the Pushtuns encountered heavy resistance they couldn't call in the needed support. The Afghans were kept out of the valley. The hammer of the Pushtuns had broken and the anvil of the infantry was getting hit hard by the Taliban. AFO however was succeeding in their mission. With aircraft stacked through the skies, they called in fire missions and bombing runs on any Taliban and AL Qaeda caught in the open. From their positions, they had perfect views of the valley and were killing dozens of fighters. The infantry were still taking heavy fire but were acting as bait for the insurgents. Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters moved from their caves to attack the American infantry and were obliterated by precision bombs. The idea to pull the infantry out of the valley was entertained but the AFO teams reported that the blocking teams were succeeding and the airstrikes would protect the infantry while killing the enemy. The infantry remained in their positions and AFO rained death upon the insurgents. 32
Crisis on Takur Ghar
While all the commanders in the operation so far had been sharing information, the generals above them lacked their context and understanding. They saw the success of the AFO teams and wanted to put new teams in place. They were about to break the rule about shared reality and adaptability. They forced two Navy SEAL teams into action without proper preparation or intelligence. One SEAL team, Mako 30 was ordered to secure the mountain top of Takur Ghar. The mountain had not been scouted and the enemy situation was unknown. The plan descended into a helicopter insertion of Mako 30 just before dawn. 33 Infra Red imaging revealed nothing of the mountain top and the helicopter was ordered in. Upon landing, the mountain top erupted in gunfire. Al Qaeda forces had been hiding on the mountain and were equipped with heavy machine guns. The helicopter aborted its landing but one SEAL, Neil Roberts, fell out and landing on Takur Ghar.
The remaining members of Mako 30 decided to go back after their missing man. The helicopter made another landing on Takur Ghar and deposited the team. Mako 30 was immediately pinned down and fighting for their lives with no sign of Roberts. They pulled off the mountain and moved to a covered position. AFO was covering Mako 30's retreat but was out of communication with the higher command.
The general who ordered Mako 30's insertion now called up a Quick Reaction Force from the 75th Ranger Regiment to rescue them from the mountain top. The QRF was flying by helicopter onto the same mountain that had shot up Mako 30. AFO recognized the danger but couldn't warn the QRF who were listening to their own higher command and not the shared intelligence of AFO. The Rangers' helicopter was shot down by the insurgent forces and the Rangers were engaged in a bitter day long battle for survival. Only the precision airstrikes from AFO Juliet team kept the Al Qaeda forces from overrunning the Rangers. Airstrikes and Ranger reinforcements allowed them to secure the mountain top where they found the body of missing SEAL, Neil Roberts. With their ordeal over, both Mako 30 and the Rangers returned to base. 34
The remaining members of Mako 30 decided to go back after their missing man. The helicopter made another landing on Takur Ghar and deposited the team. Mako 30 was immediately pinned down and fighting for their lives with no sign of Roberts. They pulled off the mountain and moved to a covered position. AFO was covering Mako 30's retreat but was out of communication with the higher command.
The general who ordered Mako 30's insertion now called up a Quick Reaction Force from the 75th Ranger Regiment to rescue them from the mountain top. The QRF was flying by helicopter onto the same mountain that had shot up Mako 30. AFO recognized the danger but couldn't warn the QRF who were listening to their own higher command and not the shared intelligence of AFO. The Rangers' helicopter was shot down by the insurgent forces and the Rangers were engaged in a bitter day long battle for survival. Only the precision airstrikes from AFO Juliet team kept the Al Qaeda forces from overrunning the Rangers. Airstrikes and Ranger reinforcements allowed them to secure the mountain top where they found the body of missing SEAL, Neil Roberts. With their ordeal over, both Mako 30 and the Rangers returned to base. 34
Conclusion
AFO teams continued to destroy insurgent positions and fighters while a renewed Pushtun force assaulted through the valley finally clearing it of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain soldiers returned to base bruised but successful. The operation ended with no resemblance to its paper conception but the Americans and Afghans had emerged victorious. They had suffered 15 dead and 80 wounded while killing several hundred enemy fighters. The Taliban and Al Qaeda presence in the valley and province was eliminate. Zia Lodin and his Pushtun forces secured their area and began the process of rebuilding. The major success of Anaconda was never capitalized upon. The US Army was quickly transferred to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan took a backseat. The rapid advances and successes were left alone for too long and the Taliban were able to return into the country and rebuild their forces. While the war in Afghanistan continues, Anaconda serves as the working result of coordination, networking, shared intelligence, and a common mission between America and Afghanistan.